My Research

This paper develops a model of Collective Household Choice with Random Attention (CHC–RA), extending stochastic choice frameworks to multi-person environments with reciprocal influence and feasibility constraints. Each decision maker forms random consideration sets according to intrinsic item salience, while cross-domain exposure induces reciprocal influence, expanding attention toward alternatives linked through the other’s domain. Preferences applied to these expanded sets generate candidate allocations that are subsequently filtered by household feasibility. The resulting stochastic choice function admits a unique representation, with default behavior arising from both limited attention and infeasibility. The paper distinguishes separable and non-separable menus, introduces separable extensions preserving collective rationality, and provides axiomatic foundations ensuring representation and uniqueness. Applications to parental investment and binary team production demonstrate how reciprocal attention produces correlated stochastic outcomes and endogenous coordination failures. A third application extends the mechanism to costly-attention settings, where the influence network determines information costs through path-dependent economies of scope in attention.

This paper introduces the Ascending Random Boolean Choice (ARBC) model, a stochastic choice framework for multidimensional decision-making in lattice-structured environments. Building on the Random Utility Maximization (RUM) tradition, ARBC extends monotone comparative statics to unordered alternatives by incorporating Strictly Superextremal (SSE) relations, which capture complementarity in stochastic choice. The model is axiomatized through Monotonicity and a novel SSE-Crossing condition, generalizing the single-crossing property to lattice structures. We establish a combinatorial random utility representation and demonstrate its implications for stochastic monotone choice. The results provide a foundation for analyzing economic decisions involving interdependent attributes, with applications to consumer behavior, demand systems, and strategic decision-making.

This note examines the uniqueness of Single-Crossing Random Utility Models (SCRUM) in rationalizing stochastic choice data. While Apesteguia et.al. (2017) show that datasets satisfying Centrality and Monotonicity have a unique SCRUM representation, we demonstrate that they can also be rationalized by a continuum of Random Utility Models (RUMs) that do not satisfy single-crossing. This challenges the necessity of single-crossing preferences in stochastic monotone comparative statics and highlights probabilistic indeterminacy in RUM representations. Unlike single-peaked or single-dipped RUMs, which permit multiple representations, SCRUM uniquely identifies support preferences, offering a more parsimonious structure for stochastic choice analysis.

I develop the Validated Random Choice with Limited Attention (VRC-LA) model, which extends random consideration to interdependent environments in which externally supplied “validations” can cause agents to discard their initial shortlist and choose only among validated options. An axiomatic characterization yields a representation for marginal stochastic choice that features both upward and downward attentional links, generating violations of standard positivity and novel comparative statics under peer influence. Identification is fragile: validation can systematically purge superior items from observed choices, obscuring underlying strict preferences. I also study a sparsified variant—Sparsely Validated Random Choice with Limited Attention (SVRC-LA)—in which only a thin set of validations can activate; this delivers sharper testable restrictions and partial identification results. The framework clarifies when shared information enhances versus distorts decision quality and provides tools for analyzing conformity, peer effects, and correlated choice in networked settings. 

We propose a new qualitative theory of equilibrium aggregate and subaggregate comparative statics for aggregative games with additively separable aggregators. Exploiting the subaggregate structure of an aggregative games with generalized aggregators, we introduce the concept of a "subaggregative" game, and in particular, "subaggregative games of strategic substitutes" (Sa-GSS) (resp., "subaggregate games of strategy complements" (Sa-GSC)), and are able to prove the existence of pure strategy Nash in both of these classes of aggregative games. We then build a self-generating aggregate lattice programming approach applied to an appropriately defined Nikaido-Isoda formulation of the parameterized equilibrium correspondence of the aggregative game to recast the question of equilibrium comparative statics questions as a self-generating monotone comparative statics problem, where equilibrium aggregates and/or subaggregates are control variables, and provide sufficient conditions for the existence of aggregate and subaggregate comparative statics. We then provide applications of our results to aggregative games arising in industrial organization, networks, team production, and social interaction models in the literature.